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Abstract. With the increasing collection of users’ data, protecting in-
dividual privacy has gained more interest. Differential Privacy is a strong
concept of protecting individuals. Na¨ıve Bayes is one of the popular ma-
chine learning algorithm, used as a baseline for many tasks. In this work,
we have provided a differentially private Na¨ıve Bayes classifier that adds
noise proportional to the smooth sensitivity of its parameters. We have
compared our result to Vaidya, Shafiq, Basu, and Hong [19] in which
they have scaled the noise to the global sensitivity of the parameters.
Our experiment results on the real-world datasets show that the ac-
curacy of our method has improved significantly while still preserving
ε-differential privacy.
1 Introduction
With the growth of user-data across the internet, it has become more important
to protect users’ sensitive information. One of the methods that has been pro-
posed as a solution to this problem is privacy-preserving data analysis providing
some ability for sharing information while it protects users’ data. Dwork, McSh-
erry, Nissim, and Smith [8] provided a strong version of guarantee for statistical
data release named differential privacy. At a high level, Differential Privacy guar-
antees that the outcome of a differentially private algorithm would be similar no
matter if a particular individual contributes personal data to the database or not.
There are generally several common approaches to differential privacy, includ-
ing Laplace Mechanism, which perturbs the parameters of the model with noise
that is drawn from the Laplace distribution, and it is scaled to the sensitivity
of the parameters. The exponential Mechanism is another important mechanism
to guarantee (ε, δ)−differential privacy [13].
The model generated by a machine learning algorithm, when trained on a
dataset, can reveal information about the training dataset. There are a series
of recent works that guarantee that the output of the machine learning model
follows the differential privacy concept. These include differentially private Deci-
sion Trees [9], SVM [17], Deep Neural Networks [1], and Logistic Regression [4].
Differential privacy is particularly relevant for ensuring that machine learning
models do not disclose individual information and even has the promise of im-
proving generalization [6]. Na¨ıve Bayes classifier is the baseline for many clas-
sification tasks. Vaidya, Shafiq, Basu, and Hong [19] provided a differentially
private algorithm for the Na¨ıve Bayes classifier. They use the Laplace Mecha-
nism to provide this guarantee based on computing the global sensitivity of the
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parameters. One of the main drawbacks of using global sensitivity is that the
amount of the noise added to the output can be high if the potential exists for
an individual to have a large impact on an outcome, in any possible dataset.
Nissim, Raskhodnikova, and Smith [15] provided a solution for this problem. In
their paper they compute the Smooth Sensitivity for a given function f which is
based on the definition of local sensitivity. The local sensitivity of f is the maxi-
mum amount of change in f if we change a single element in a particular dataset
x, i.e., go to one of the neighbors of x. It is obvious that the local sensitivity of
a given function is not greater than its global sensitivity. Ideally, we would like
to add noise proportional to the local sensitivity of f , but this does not satisfy
the definition of differential privacy, hence, in [15] they compute a β−smooth
function which is the smallest upper bound for the local sensitivity that provides
ε-differential privacy. In this paper, we have provided an ε-differentially private
algorithm for the Na¨ıve Bayes classifier based on the smooth sensitivity of the
parameters of the model.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we first give a brief overview of the Na¨ıve Bayes classifier, then
we provide an overview of the differential privacy. More specifically, we state the
definitions for ε−differential privacy and smooth sensitivity.
2.1 Na¨ıve Bayes Classifier
The Na¨ıve Bayes classifier is a family of probabilistic classifier that uses the
Bayes’ Theorem and assumes the independence between features. That is, it as-
sumes that the presence of a particular feature is unrelated to any other features.
The Na¨ıve Bayes classifier can handle an arbitrary number of independent
variables, whether continuous or categorical, and classifies an instance to one of
the finite number of classes.
Thus, the learning task would be that for each instanceX =< X1, X2, . . . , Xm >
consists of m features, it assigns probability
Pr(cj |X1, X2, . . . , Xm)
for each of K possible label classes C = {c1, c2, . . . , cK}.
To train the Na¨ıve Bayes model, a set of training examples with a corre-
sponding target label is provided. The task is to assign a new class cMAP to an
unseen instance X =< X1, X2, . . . , Xm >.
cMAP = arg max
j∈{1,...,K}
Pr(cj |X1, X2, . . . , Xm)
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By using Bayes’ theorem, we can further decompose the conditional probability
to:
cMAP = arg max
j∈{1,...,K}
(
Pr(X1, X2, . . . , Xm|cj) Pr(cj)
Pr(X1, X2, . . . , Xm)
)
= arg max
j∈{1,...,K}
(Pr(X1, X2, . . . , Xm|cj) Pr(cj))
The Na¨ıve Bayes classifier makes the further simplifying assumption that the
attribute values are conditionally independent, given the target value. Therefore:
cNB = arg max
j∈{1,...,K}
Pr(cj)
m∏
i=1
Pr(Xi|cj)
where cNB denotes the final class label for the instance X =< X1, X2, . . . , Xm >.
From the training dataset, we can pre-compute the conditional probabilities
Pr(Xi|cj). Also, Pr(cj) can be computed by counting the number of items that
are labeled cj in the training dataset. As with Vaidya, Shafiq, Basu, and Hong’s
work [19], we deal with both categorical and numerical attributes. The way that
we estimate the probability is different for each class:
– Categorical Value: For a categorical attribute Xi with J possible attribute
values a1, a2, . . . , aJ , the probability Pr(Xi = ak|cj) = τ{Xi=ak∧C=cj}τ{C=cj} , where
the τ{x} operator returns the number of elements in the training set D that
satisfy property x. To prevent division by zero, we use Laplace smoothing
which adds 1 to all counts.
– Numerical Value: For a numerical attribute Xi, one standard approach is to
assume that for each possible discrete value ck of C, the distribution of each
continuous Xi is Gaussian, and is defined by a mean and standard deviation
specific to Xi and ck [14]. In order to train such a Na¨ıve Bayes classifier we
must therefore estimate the mean and standard deviation of these Gaussians:
µik = E[Xi|C = ck]
σ2ik = E[(Xi − µik)2|C = ck]
for each numerical attribute Xi and each possible value ck of C.
The probability density function of Gaussian distribution is as follows:
f(x;µ, σ2) =
1√
2piσ
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2
After estimating the values for mean and variance, the probability that an
instance is of class Cj can be directly computed from the density function.
2.2 Differential Privacy
Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith [8] defined the notion of differential privacy.
At a high level, differential privacy guarantees that if your data is a part of a
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database from which we release information, then the released information will
be similar if your data is a part of the database or not. That is, your data
will have a negligible impact on the released information. Hence, no meaningful
information can be inferred about individuals. The definitions below come from
their work.
Definition 1. (Laplace Distribution) The probability density function (p.d.f) of
the Laplace distribution Lap(µ, λ) is f(x|µ, λ) = 12λe−|x−µ|/λ with mean µ and
standard deviation
√
2λ.
Definition 2. (Cauchy Distribution) The probability density function (p.d.f) of
the Cauchy distribution Cauchy(x0, λ) is f(x|x0, λ) = 1λpi(1+((x−x0)/λ)2) with
location parameter x0 and scale λ.
Let D1, . . . ,Dm denote domains, each of which could be categorical or nu-
merical. A database D consists of n rows, {X(1), X(2), . . . , X(n)}, where each
X(i) ∈ D1 × . . .Dm.
We say two databases D1 and D2 are at distance k of each other and we
write it as d(D1, D2) = k if they differ by k rows. Two database D1 and D2 are
called neighbors if d(D1, D2) = 1.
Definition 3. (Global Sensitivity). For f : D → R, the global sensitivity of f
with respect to `1 metric is:
GSf = max
x,y:d(x,y)=1
||f(x)− f(y)||1
Definition 4. (Differential Privacy). A randomized Mechanism M : D → R
with domain D and range R is ε-differentially private if for all D1, D2 ∈ D
satisfying d(D1, D2) = 1, and for all sets S ⊆ R of possible outputs:
Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ eε Pr[M(D2) ∈ S]
We also make use of a couple of properties of the way differentially private
mechanisms combine. Sequential composition states that privacy loss is additive:
If we take “multiple looks” at the data, the privacy budget ε expended is the
sum of the privacy budgets εi of each “look”.
Theorem 1. (Sequential Composition [12] [7]) Let M1 : D → R1 be an ε1-
differentially private algorithm, and let M2 : D → R2 be an ε2-differentially
private algorithm. Then their combination, defined to be M1,2 : D → R1 × R2
by the mapping: M1,2(x) = (M1(x),M2(x)) is ε1 + ε2-differentially private.
Dwork et al. [8] showed how to calibrate the noise to the global sensitivity of
the function f such that it satisfies ε−differential privacy . In their work, they
have shown that the magnitude of the noise is proportional to Lap(0, GSf/ε).
Intuitively, whenever we add noise proportional to the global sensitivity of f , we
are adding noise proportional to the maximum magnitude of changes in f . The
main drawback of computing the global sensitivity of f is that the magnitude
of the noise would be high for many functions, which in terms make the output
of the model meaningless.
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3 Smooth Sensitivity
As described in the previous section, the magnitude of noise added by the Laplace
mechanism depends on the global sensitivity of f and the privacy parameter ε,
but not on the database D. For many functions, this approach yields high noise,
which makes the output of the function meaningless. In this section, we give
definitions of a local measure of sensitivity from Nissim, Raskhodnikova, and
Smith [15].
Definition 5. (Local Sensitivity). For f : D → R and x ∈ D the local sensitivity
of f at x (with respect to the `1 metric) is:
LSf (x) = max
y:d(x,y)=1
||f(x)− f(y)||1
Note that GSf = max
x
LSf (x). We would like to be able to add noise propor-
tional to local sensitivity. However, the local sensitivity may itself be high sen-
sitivity, i.e., noise magnitude may compromise privacy. Next, we define Smooth
bound, which adding a noise proportional to it would be safe.
Definition 6. (A Smooth bound). For β > 0, a function S : D → R+ is a
β−smooth upper bound on the local sensitivity of f if it satisfies the following
requirements:
– ∀x ∈ D : S(x) ≥ LSf (x)
– ∀x, y ∈ D, d(x, y) = 1 : S(x) ≤ eβS(y)
Definition 7. (Smooth Sensitivity). For β > 0, the β-smooth sensitivity of f
is:
S∗f,β(x) = max
y∈D
(LSf (y).e
−βd(x,y))
The smooth sensitivity S∗f,β(x) is the smallest function that satisfies Defini-
tion 6.
Nissim et al. [15] showed that one could do much better than scaling the
noise to the global sensitivity of f by adding noise proportional to the Smooth
sensitivity of f where it will give much higher output accuracy.
3.1 Computing Smooth Sensitivity
In this section, we describe how to compute the smooth sensitivity of a function.
Definition 8. The sensitivity of f at distance k is:
Ak(x) = max
y∈D:d(x,y)≤k
LSf (y)
We can express the smooth sensitivity of f in terms of Ak as follows:
S∗f,ε(x) = max
k=0,1,...,n
e−kε( max
y:d(x,y)=k
LSf (y))
= max
k=0,1...,n
e−kεA(k)(x)
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3.2 Calibrating noise to the smooth sensitivity
To release a function f of the database D, the curator computes f and pub-
lishes M(D) = f(D) + λZ where Z is a random variable drawn from a noise
distribution, and λ is the scaling parameter.
Theorem 2. (Nissim et al. [15]) Let f : D → R be any real-valued function and
let S : D → R be a β-smooth upper bound on the local sensitivity of f . Then we
have:
– if β ≤ ε2(γ+1) and γ > 1, the algorithm x → f(x) + 2(γ+1)S(x)ε η where η is
sampled with distribution h(z) ≈ 11+|z|γ , is ε-deferentially private.
Nissim et al. [15] showed that to scale the noise to the smooth sensitivity of f ,
it is sufficient to sample from an admissible noise distribution, which we define
next.
For a subset S of Rd, we write S + ξ for the set {z + ξ|z ∈ S}, and εδ.S for
the set {ελ.z|z ∈ S}. We also write a± b for the interval [a− b, a+ b].
Definition 9. (Nissim et al. [15]) A probability distribution on Rn, given by a
density function h, is (α, β)-admissible (with respect to `1), if for α = α(ε, δ),
β = β(ε, δ), the following two conditions hold for all δ ∈ Rn and λ ∈ R satisfying
||ξ||1 ≤ α and |λ| ≤ β, and for all measurable subsets S ⊂ Rn:
– Sliding Property:
Pr
Z∼h
[Z ∈ S] ≤ e ε2 . Pr
Z∼h
[Z ∈ S + ξ] + δ/2
– Dilation Property:
Pr
Z∼h
[Z ∈ S] ≤ eε/2. Pr
Z∼h
[Z ∈ eλ.S] + δ/2
Theorem 3. (Nissim et al. [15]) For any γ > 1, the distribution with den-
sity h(z) ≈ 11+|z|γ is ( ε2(γ+1) , ε2(γ+1) )−admissible. Moreover, the n−dimensional
product of independent copies of h is ( ε2(γ+1) ,
ε
2(γ+1) ) admissible.
4 Differential Private Na¨ıve Bayes
In this section, we describe a differentially private Na¨ıve Bayes classifier. We
first compute the Na¨ıve Bayes parameters according to the Section 2.1. Then
depending on the type of the attributes, we perturb the parameters with noise
such that it preserves ε-differential privacy. As we stated in Section 2.1, a stan-
dard approach for fitting a machine learning model to a numerical attribute is
to assume that the underlying distribution is Gaussian. Hence, we start this sec-
tion by computing the Smooth sensitivity for estimating the parameters of the
Gaussian Distribution.
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4.1 Smooth Sensitivity of Mean
We start by computing the Smooth sensitivity of the mean of a Gaussian distri-
bution.
Theorem 4. Given a non-decreasing list of n bounded real numbers
V = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} in the range of the interval [L,U ], the Smooth sensitivity
of the mean of V can be computed in O(n2).
Proof. Consider the set V = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} with mean µV = x1+x2+...+xnn and
a set V ′ = {x′1, x′2, . . . , x′n} with mean µV ′ = x
′
1+x
′
2+...+x
′
n
n where d(V, V
′) = k,
i.e., it differs from V by k elements such that |µV − µV ′ | is maximized. In the
case that µV ′ > µV , it is easy to see that we have to replace x1, x2, . . . , xk
with U (See Fig. 1). Similarly, in the case that µV > µV ′ , we should replace
xn−k+1, xn−k+2, . . . , xn with L. Iterating through all possible choices of 1 ≤ k ≤
n gives us the smooth sensitivity.
Fig. 1: (top): blue dots represents points on the x axis where the red cross mark
represents their corresponding mean. (middle): shifting the mean towards the
right-side by picking the k-smallest numbers and replacing them with U . (bot-
tom): shifting the mean towards the left-side by picking the k-largest numbers
and replacing them with L.
4.2 Smooth Sensitivity of Variance
In this section, we will describe how to compute the smooth sensitivity of vari-
ance.
Definition 10. (k-maximal variance subset) Given a set V = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}
of n real numbers in ascending order and an integer k(k < n), a subset Q ⊂ V
is called k-maximal variance subset of V if |Q| = k and ∀Q′ ⊂ V,Q′ 6= Q where
|Q′| = k, Var[Q′] ≤ Var[U ].
Theorem 5. Given a non-decreasing list of n bounded real numbers
V = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} in the range of the interval [L,U ] and an integer k(k < n),
the k−maximal variance subset can be computed in O(n2).
Proof. Let Q = {Γ1, Γ2, . . . , Γk} be the k−maximal variance of V . We define the
mean of Q to be µQ =
1
k (Γ1 + Γ2 + . . .+ Γk). Let Q
′ = {Γ1, Γ2, . . . , Γk +∆}, i.e. it
only differs from Q by adding ∆ to Γk. Let µQ′ be the mean of Q
′, we have:
µQ′ = µQ +
1
k
∆
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Let σ2Q and σ
2
Q′ be the variance of Q and Q
′, respectively. The variance of
Q = {Γ1, Γ2, . . . , Γk} (multiplied by k) is:
kσ2Q = (Γ
2
1 + . . .+ Γ
2
k )− kµ2Q
Now we will see the impact of adding ∆ to Γk on the variance.
kσ2Q′ − kσ2Q = [(Γk + ∆)2 − Γ2k ]− k[µ2Q′ − µ2Q]
= [Γ2k + ∆
2 + 2Γk∆− Γ2k ]− k(µQ +
∆
k
)2 − kµ2Q
= [Γ2k + ∆
2 + 2Γk∆− Γ2k ]− kµ2Q −
∆2
k
− 2µQ∆− kµ2Q
= 2∆(Γk − µQ) + k − 1
k
∆2
≥ 2∆(Γk − µQ)
This value will be non-negative whenever the sign of ∆ and (Γk−µQ) are the
same. That is, the difference in the variance will increase if we move Γk further
from the mean µQ.
Now assume that we are given a variance-maximizing sequence S of k values
chosen from V = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}. Assume for the contradiction that S contains
an element xm where xm is not at the tail of V . That means there exist xr r 6= m,
where if we replace xm with xr by the given inequalities we will increase the
variance and ∆ = xm − xr which contradiction that S is a variance maximizing
sequence. Now given V = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, we know that the k-maximal variance
subset selects elements from tail of V . Iterating through all possible cases of
0 ≤ i ≤ k, j = k− i, where the first i elements are selected from the beginning of
V , i.e. (x1, x2, . . . , xi) , and j elements are selected from the end of the sequence,
i.e., (xn−j+1, . . . , xn−1, xn) and selecting the sequence that gives the maximum
variance will be the solution to the k-maximal variance subset.
Corollary 1. Given a non-decreasing list of n bounded real numbers
V = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} in the range [L,U ] and an integer k (k < n), the k-maximal
variance subset can be achieved by removing n− k consecutive elements in V .
Definition 11. (k-minimal variance subset) Given a set V = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}
of n real numbers in ascending order and an integer k(k < n), a subset Q ⊂ V
is called k-minimal variance subset of V if |Q| = k and ∀Q′ ⊂ V,Q′ 6= Q where
|Q| = k, Var[Q′] ≥ Var[Q].
Theorem 6. Given a non-decreasing list of n bounded real numbers
V = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} in the range of the interval [L,U ] and an integer k (k < n),
the k-minimal variance subset can be computed in O(n2).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5. Hence, given V =
{x1, x2, . . . , xn} the optimal solution would remove {x1, x2, . . . , xi} and
{xn−k+i, . . . , xn−1, xn}. Iterating through all possible 0 ≤ i ≤ k would give the
optimal solution.
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Theorem 7. Given a non-decreasing list of n bounded real numbers
V = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} in the range of the interval [L,U ], the Smooth sensitivity
of the variance of V can be computed in O(n2).
Fig. 2: Blue dots represents points on the x axis where the red cross mark rep-
resents their corresponding mean. For a fixed k = 6, we use a sliding window
(shaded box) and move it through x axis. We assign t of the numbers to L and
k − t to U and save the maximum variance of the resulted sequence.
Proof. By Corollary 1, the k-maximal variance subset can be achieved by remov-
ing n−k consecutive elements. We can iterate through all k consecutive elements
in V and assign t of them to be L, and k−t of them to be U . The maximum over
all possible cases would be the maximal variance. Similarly, for minimizing the
variance by using Theorem 6, we replace {x1, x2, . . . , xt}, i.e., the first t elements
and {xn−k+t, . . . , xn}, i.e., the last k − t elements with µ = xt+1,xt+2,...,xn−k+t−1(n−k−2)
Fig. 3 shows an example for the extreme change of the global sensitivity.
L
L
U
U
Fig. 3: Maximum change of the global sensitivity. (top): all points are on L, by
changing k = 3 points to the other extreme point (U), the variance and mean
have the maximum change.
5 Algorithm
We now give pseudocode to describe the algorithm for computing the smooth
sensitivity of the Na¨ıve Bayes classifier. At a high level, we first compute the
parameters of the Na¨ıve Bayes model and then we compute the smooth sen-
sitivity of each parameters and we perturb the parameters with noise drawn
from Cauchy distribution. From Theorem 4 and Theorem 7, one can compute
the smooth sensitivity of the parameters for fitting a Gaussian distribution to
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the continuous data. For the discrete variables the sensitivity is 1 and can be
perturbed by adding small amount of noise 1/ε.
We use an equal division of privacy budget between all accesses to data
in keeping with [19]. Our goal for this paper is to show the value of smooth
sensitivity, so we have kept with their division; we briefly discuss other allocations
of privacy budget in Section 6.3.
Algorithm 1 Differentially private Na¨ıve Bayes Classifier
Require: Labeled training data D = {(X(i), yi)}ni=1
Require: ε : the privacy parameter
Require: Laplace(α, β): samples the Laplace distribution with mean α and scale β.
Require: Cauchy(α, β): samples the Cauchy distribution with location parameter α
and scale β.
1: num count ← number of numerical attributes of D
2: cat count ← number of categorical attributes of D
3: ε′ ← ε/(2 ∗ num count + cat count + 1)
4: for each attribute Xj do
5: if Xj is categorical then
6: sensitivity, s ← 1
7: scale factor, sf ← s/ε′
8: ∀ counts τ{Xj = ak ∧ C = cl}′ = τ{Xj = ak ∧ C = cl}+ Laplace(0, sf)
9: Use τ{Xj = ak ∧ C = cl}′ to compute Pr(ak|cl)
10: end if
11: if Xj is numeric then
12: Compute the Smooth Sensitivity, s for mean µjk as per Theorem 4
13: scale factor, sf ← √2s/ε′
14: µ′jk ← µjk + Cauchy(0, sf)
15: Compute the Smooth Sensitivity, s for the standard deviation σjk as per
Theorem 7
16: scale factor, sf ← √2s/ε′
17: σ′jk ← σjk + Cauchy(0, sf)
18: Use µ′jk and σ
′
jk to compute Pr(xi|ck)
19: end if
20: for each class cj do
21: count τ{C = cj}′ ← τ{C = cj}+ Cauchy(0,
√
2S/ε′)
22: Use τ{C = cj}′ to compute the prior Pr(cj)
23: end for
24: end for
Similar to Vaidya et al.’s [19] approach, when Cauchy noise is added, it is
possible to make mean, standard deviation, counts, and class prior negative. To
prevent this, we truncated the negative values to zero.
5.1 Complete Privacy Guarantee
Theorem 8. Algorithm 1 provides ε-differential privacy.
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Proof. Each step i of the Algorithm 1 is ε′i-differentially private. By Theorem 1,
the composition of finite number of εi-differentially private algorithm is itself
(
∑
i
ε′i)−differentially private.
5.2 Runtime analysis of Algorithm 1
In this section, we compute the running time of the Algorithm 1.
Theorem 9. Algorithm 1 computes differentially private Na¨ıve Bayes in O(nk+
n2).
Proof. The most time consuming part of computing differentially private Na¨ıve
Bayes classifier is Theorem 5 that computes the smooth sensitivity of the variance
in O(n2) where n is the number of rows in dataset. The rest of the computation
can be done in linear time, hence, the pre-processing time is O(n2). The running
time of the standard Na¨ıve Bayes is O(nk), therefore, the total running time of
differentially private Na¨ıve Bayes with the added pre-processing is O(nk + n2).
6 Experimental Result
We have implemented our own Na¨ıve Bayes classifier in Python.
6.1 Datasets
We have experimented our algorithm on several real datasets, including the
IPUMS USA: Version 8.0 Extract of 1940 Census for U.S. Census Bureau Disclo-
sure Avoidance Research, as well as several datasets from the UCI repository [5]
used in [19]: Mushroom, Adult, Skin, and Seed.
1. UCI Dataset Adult dataset is drawn from 1994 census data of the United
States. It consists of 48K records, the binary classification task is to predict
if the income of an individual is less than or equal to 50K or not. Mush-
room dataset includes descriptions of hypothetical samples corresponding
to 23 species of gilled mushrooms in the Agaricus and Lepiota Family. Each
species is identified as definitely edible, definitely poisonous, or of unknown
edibility and not recommended. Skin dataset [3] is collected by randomly
sampling B,G,R values from face images of various age groups (young, mid-
dle, and old), race groups (white, black, and asian), and genders obtained
from FERET database [16] and PAL database. Seed dataset includes group
comprised kernels belonging to three different varieties of wheat: Kama, Rosa
and Canadian, 70 elements each, randomly selected for the experiment.
2. IPUMS The Adult dataset, while widely used, is not a uniform population
sample and thus is a poor choice for evaluating machine learning. It is a post-
stratified dataset intended to be used with weighted values, and as such is
not representative of a real population when used as unweighted values. As
a better example, we evaluated with a dataset derived from the 1940 Census
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that is a uniform sample of the population, and as such is an appropriate
representation for a machine learning task. 1 We used the 13 attributes that
are included in the adult dataset, and construct a binary classification task to
predict whether the income of an individual is less than or equal to the mean
income of the population. (We discarded individuals with unknown values.)
To give an idea of the variance across different populations, we report values
for different U.S. States.
Table 1 shows the detailed description of the datasets that we have used for
this experiment.
Dataset No. of Records Attributes Class
Adult 48K 14 2
Mushroom 8K 22 2
Seed 210 7 3
Skin 245K 3 2
Wyoming 250K 13 2
Nevada 110K 13 2
Washington 1.7M 13 2
Oregon 1M 13 2
Table 1: Description of the datasets used for our experiment.
6.2 Experiment Setup
Since there is randomness in our algorithm for adding noise, we have run our
algorithm five iterations with 10-fold cross-validation; we show mean and error
bars across the iterations. We use two baselines: a standard Na¨ıve Bayes classifier
and the constant “predict the majority class” classifier. Probably the most inter-
esting comparison is with the Differentially Private classifier by Vaidya, Shafiq,
Basu, and Hong [19], as this shows the specific gains achieved through using
smooth sensitivity rather than global sensitivity.
Note that [19] reports results in terms of the privacy budget used for each
attribute; we instead report the total privacy budget utilized under sequential
composition (Theorem 1). This is simply a scaling of epsilon and does not fun-
damentally change from their reported results. Results are shown in Figures
4-12.
6.3 Varying allocation of privacy budget
We briefly experimented with varying the allocation of privacy budget between
categorical and numeric variables. With the exception of substantially over-
weighting categorical variables and giving little privacy budget (high noise) for
1 The IPUMS data us available at https://usa.ipums.org/usa/
1940CensusDASTestData.shtml
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Fig. 4: Accuracy at various values of ε:
Adult dataset
100 10¡1 5 ¤ 10¡2 10¡2 5 ¤ 10¡3 10¡3
"
50
60
70
80
90
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Global Sensitivity
Smooth Sensitivity
Naive Bayes Baseline
Most Frequent Class
Fig. 5: Accuracy at various values of ε:
Mushroom dataset
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Fig. 6: Accuracy at various values of ε:
Seed dataset
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Fig. 7: Accuracy at various values of ε:
Skin dataset
100 10¡1 5 ¤ 10¡2 10¡2 5 ¤ 10¡3 10¡3
"
50
55
60
65
70
75
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Global Sensitivity
Smooth Sensitivity
Naive Bayes Baseline
Most Frequent Class
Fig. 8: Accuracy at various values of ε:
Wyoming from 1940 Census
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Fig. 9: Accuracy at various values of ε:
Nevada from 1940 Census
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Fig. 10: Adult dataset: Accuracy at var-
ious values of ε for varying allocation of
privacy budget - numerical:categorical
numeric (line 1:2), the results are inconclusive; the differences are well within
the error seen across cross-validation groups. An example is shown in Fig. 10.
Algorithm 1 and all other figures correspond to the “2:1” allocation in Fig. 10:
2 ∗ ε′ allocated to each numeric attribute, one for the mean estimation, and one
for standard deviation. Further research would be needed to establish reasoning
to apply additional weight to numeric or categorical variables.
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Fig. 11: Accuracy at various values of ε:
Oregon from 1940 Census
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Fig. 12: Accuracy at various values of ε:
Washington from 1940 Census
7 Related Work
Anandan and Clifton [2] provided a differentially private feature selection for
data mining tasks. In their work they analyze the sensitivity of various feature
selection techniques used in data mining and show that some of them are not
suitable for differentially private analysis due to high sensitivity.
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Making machine learning models differentially private is in a great interest.
Jagannathan, Pillaipakkamnatt and Wright [9] gave a differentially private al-
gorithm for random decision trees. Abadi et al. [1] gave a differentially private
framework for deep learning models. Privacy preserving Na¨ıve Bayes has been
studied before. Kantarcioglu et al. [10] proposed privacy-preserving Na¨ıve Bayes
classifier for horizontally partitioned data. Their solution uses secure summation
and logarithm to learn distributed Na¨ıve Bayes classifier securely. Vaidya and
Clifton [18] gave a solution to the same problem but for vertically partitioned
data based on the semi-honest model.
In the context of Differential privacy, Vaidya et al. [19] proposed a differen-
tially private Na¨ıve Bayes classifier. In their solution they compute the global
sensitivity of the parameters and use Laplace mechanism to make the model dif-
ferentially private. In their model, they assume that there exist a single curator
that has all data. Li et al. [11] proposed a new model for a differentially private
Na¨ıve Bayes classifier over multiple data sources. Their proposed method enables
a trainer to train a Na¨ıve Bayes classifier over the dataset provided jointly by
different data owners, without the help of a trusted curator. Yilmaz et al. [20]
provided a differentially private Na¨ıve Bayes classifier under the local differential
privacy setting. In the local differential privacy, individuals send their perturbed
input data to an aggregator which estimates all probabilities needed by the Na¨ıve
Bayes classifier. Their solution works for both discrete and continuous data.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a differentially private Na¨ıve Bayes Classifier
using Smooth Sensitivity framework. The datasets that we were working on
contained both numerical and categorical values. For fitting numerical values, we
have used the Gaussian distribution. We have computed the smooth sensitivity
of the parameters of the Gaussian, which are µ and σ. To obtain the ε-differential
private algorithm, we have added noise proportional to the smooth sensitivity
of the parameters. Previous work on Na¨ıve Bayes differential private classifier is
done by Vaidya, Shafiq, Basu, and Hong [19] where they perturb the parameters
of the Na¨ıve Bayes classifier by a noise that is scaled to the global sensitivity
of the parameters. Generally, adding noise proportional to the global sensitivity
may add too much noise where it makes the output of the model meaningless in
many functions. By experimenting our method on real-world datasets including
available datasets on UCI repository: Adult, Mushroom, Seed, and Skin and US
CENSUS 1940 on four different states, the accuracy of our method has increased
while it still satisfies the ε-differential privacy definition.
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